



# TOBBMUN '26

TURKIYE ODALAR VE BORSALAR BIRLIGI SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL  
MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE


## H-UNSC

UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL:

ALTAN CENGİZ

ACADEMIC ASSISTANT:

ALİ ÖZER



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**Letter From the Secretariat**

Honourable participants of TOBBMUN'26,

As the Secretaries-General of TOBBMUN'26, taking place from January 17th to January 20th, we would like to extend our warmest welcome to all participants of this prestigious conference.

With its first official edition, and this year's first conference in Antalya, of TOBBMUN, we are proudly bringing together enthusiastic and passionate individuals eager to experience, witness the best instance of diplomacy, collaboration, and intellectual exchange at its finest. As the years and institutions first conference in Antalya, we are confident that we will not only achieve but we will even surpass our motto.

Throughout the path we took in the MUN circuit, we have worked hard and tirelessly to build this conference upon the foundation of experience, dedication, and innovation. With the knowledge and expertise we have gained, we want to shed light on your experience as well and help you feel the same joy we did while creating and attending such committees.

With a blend of experienced and new generation of academic members, we strongly believe that TOBBMUN'26 will provide an unparalleled MUN experience for all of its participants. The seasoned members of our academic team contribute their deep knowledge and insight, while the newer members bring forward creativity and fresh perspectives.

We hope and believe that this conference will grant all participants a platform and an opportunity for all attendees to develop and acquire skills, learn how the dynamics of different specialized committees work, and engage in a constructive way. By organizing TOBBMUN'26, we are not only trying to create something remarkable but also to inspire and contribute to the growth of new members and delegates within the MUN community.

To achieve this, we have brought an academic team of unparalleled intellect and proven capability, supported by an organization team marked by its commitment and strength. When you attend TOBBMUN'26, you will start your MUN year at the very peak of excellence and in the rest of the year, you will continue striving to reach even higher summits.

Welcome to TOBBMUN'26,

With our warmest regards,

Secretaries – Generals of TOBBMUN'26,

Kuzey Karlık & Mustafa Aslan.

### **Letter From the Under Secretaries General**

Esteemed participants,

As the Under Secretaries General of H-UNSC, I welcome each and every one of you to the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye Anatolian High School Model United Nations Conference 2026. We had a lot of fun writing this guide with my Academic Assistant Ali. I hope that you will enjoy reading this guide as much as we enjoyed writing it. In this committee you are expected to come to a solution which will set an end to the havoc and the violence in the streets of Cyprus and put an end to this problem for once and all. If you have any inquiries, you can always ask through my mail [altan.cengiz09@gmail.com](mailto:altan.cengiz09@gmail.com). Before finishing this letter, I would like to thank the Executive Team (Especially my distant relative Mustafa) for seeing me fit for this role. I would also like to thank Bersun, my sister who always led me through; if you weren't there for me, I could not have made it up here.

The whole world is yours, waiting to be conquered.

Cordially yours,

Altan Cengiz,, Under Secretaries General of H-UNSC

### **Letter From the Academic Assistant**

Dear participants,

I would like to welcome you all to the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye Anatolian High School Model United Nations Conference 2026 H-UNSC committee as the academic assistant of the committee. I and Altan worked together to come up with this

extensive guide. We had a lot of fun working on this guide and I hope you will like it too. We are expecting you to come up with possible solutions that would end the violence and crisis in Cyprus. If you happen to have any questions and inquiries, do not hesitate to reach me through my e-mail [aliozer2009@gmail.com](mailto:aliozer2009@gmail.com). Lastly I would like to thank the Executive team for organizing this conference and my under secretaries general Altan Cengiz for considering me appropriate to be his academic assistant.

The faith of Cyprus is in your hands,

Best regards,

Ali Özer, Academic Assistant of H-UNSC

## **1. Introduction to the Historical United Nations Security Council (H-UNSC)**

### **1.1. History, Scope and Membership**

#### **1.1.1 History**

After the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II, Allied powers formed the United Nations by signing the UN Charter on 26 June 1945 to replace the League of Nations. With the formation of the United Nations, a call for a new body to prevent further conflicts and ensure international peace was made, which led to the establishment of the United Nations Security Council on 24 October 1945. Since its establishment, the UNSC has carried out multiple peacekeeping operations around the globe.

#### **1.1.2 Scope**

UNSC is the primary organ in the United Nations Charter responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The powers and functions of the UNSC include taking military actions against aggressors, calling upon members to impose economic sanctions and other measures that do not involve the use of force, approving any changes made to the UN Charter, electing the Judges of the International Court of Justice with the Assembly, establishing peacekeeping operations

and recommending the admission of new members. The Security Council also is the only UN body with decision making powers and authority to issue resolutions that are binding to its member states.

### **1.1.3 Membership**

UNSC consists of 15 members, of which 5 of them are permanent and 10 non permanent members.

The five permanent members have veto power and are able to drop any proposal apart from procedural matters. At the establishment of the UNSC in 1945 the five permanent members were the Republic of China, France, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. As the name implies, permanent members have permanent seats in the Security Council and therefore are not changed or elected. However, there has been two major changes to the permanent members with the first one being the government reshuffle on China from the Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government to the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War, the UNSC recognized People's Republic of China as the rightful representative of China in 1971. The second major change was the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 with the Russian Federation accepted as its successor, maintaining the Soviet Union's position in the Security Council.

Meanwhile non permanent members hold temporary seats and are elected by the UN General Assembly for periods of two years starting on 1 January on a rotating basis by geographical region, with five of them being replaced each year. In its first two decades, the UNSC had 6 non permanent members which were Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands and Poland. The number of non-permanent members was raised to 10 later in 1965. Although non permanent members do not have veto power, they still can hold an important place during debates.

## **1.2. Keywords and Definitions**

### **1.2.1. Enosis and Megali-Idea**

Enosis is a byproduct of the megali idea which firstly surfaced with the conquest of Istanbul by Mehmed the Conqueror and the re-establishment of the Patriarchate, and it evolved into its culmination with Catherine II's Greek Project (Sorel, 1998: 28; Finkel, 2010: 340). "Megali Idea" means in Greek "The Big Idea". This concept intends to unite the places where the Greeks lived,

under the flag of Greece, especially in the east of Greece. The basic idea of “Megali Idea” is the revival of the Greek Empire with the Byzantine Empire of Pontus re-designs, the establishment of the great Helen Empire<sup>1</sup>. Enosis is a non-negotiable aim of the Greek megali-idea. In the context of this committee it roughly translates to the unification of the whole island with Greece as said earlier. Enosis is the base problem of our agenda item and the whole conflict. Enosis is generally associated with Greek nationalism as Greek Cypriots saw unification with Greece as a means of liberation from British colonial rule and join their ethnic homeland.

### **1.2.2. Taksim**

The concept of Taksim (partition) emerged as a political idea for Cyprus that recommended the division of the island into separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot zones. Initially, many Turkish Cypriot and Turkish leaders opposed the idea of full partition, viewing it as an extreme and undesirable outcome. However, following the intercommunal violence of December 1963 and the subsequent events that severely undermined the viability of a unified Cypriot state, Taksim gained acceptance among the Turkish Block. By the late 1960s and especially after 1974, it was openly embraced as a more “realistic” and necessary solution to ensure the security and political rights of the Turkish Cypriot community.

### **1.2.3. Peacekeeping Force**

Peacekeeping, as the UN defines it, is a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for lasting peace. UN Peacekeeping follows three main principles that are the consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Peacekeeping provides security in conflict zones and the political and peacebuilding support to transition from a state of war to peace. Although as of 2025 the UNSC has 11 active peacekeeping missions, keep in mind that this is a historical committee that takes part in March 1964.

### **1.2.4. Guarantor Powers**

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<sup>1</sup> Kalelioğlu, O. (2008). Türk Yunan İlişkileri ve Megali İdea. *Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, 11(41), 105-123.

Treaty of Guarantee recognized Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as guarantor powers of Cyprus. It required the guarantor powers to maintain peace, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Article IV of Treaty of Guarantee allowed guarantor powers to take joint actions together or on their own as a last resort to restore the independence, sovereignty and bicomunal democratic structure of Cyprus as established in the Treaty of Guarantee. On 15 July 1974, the bicomunal structure of Cyprus was at danger due to the July 1974 Greek coup which was immediately viewed as illegal and unrightful, which justified Turkey to take action on their own and create a bridgehead and corridor between Kyrenia and Nicosia enclave as a last resort to re-establish state of affairs according to the Treaty.

#### **1.2.5. Cold War Dynamics**

Cold War dynamics involves a series of political interactions and tensions between the United States and Soviet Union that lasted from the end of World War II to dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Cold War dynamics primarily evolve around political, technological, ideological and economic development and race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers avoided direct conflict and rather supported opposing sides in regional conflicts which are also known as proxy wars. In the 1963-1964 Cyprus crisis, neither of the sides militarily intervened but rather took diplomatic approaches for avoiding escalations. The Soviet Union supported the independence of Cyprus, not because it cared about the rights of Cypriots, but rather to reduce possible NATO influence on Cyprus. Meanwhile the United States opted for stability and peace of Cyprus rather than independence and sovereignty.

#### **1.2.6. Sovereignty**

Sovereignty is the authority of a specific group, community or individual to rule over a territory. Sovereignty means that a country can govern itself and make laws without outside interruptions. Such interruptions violate the sovereignty and independence of a country, causing national threat. A country that is controlled by other countries, partially or completely, has lost its sovereignty and is unable to fully govern itself.

### 1.3. Important Figures

#### 1.3.1. Archbishop Makarios



Archbishop Makarios III, was born Michael Mouskos in 1913 to a poor family in a small village near Paphos, in the west of the island. He entered the priesthood at the age of 13 and, after studying in Greece, was awarded a scholarship in the United States. However, his studies there were cut short when he was elected bishop of Kition, taking the name Makarios. Just two years later, in 1950, Makarios was elected archbishop of Cyprus at age 37. Over the next decade, he played a central part in efforts to end British rule over the island, and when Cyprus became independent in


1960 he was elected as the first president of the new state.

As one might expect, opinion about Makarios is sharply divided. Turkish Cypriots hold him responsible for bringing down the post-independence constitutional order and forcing them out of the government. Among Greek Cypriots, many fervently believe that for all his mistakes he ultimately sought the best for the Greek Cypriot people. Others, however, regard him as a traitor for eventually abandoning the dream of enosis. Internationally, he also provoked strong reactions. Christopher Hitchens, the author and journalist famed for his antireligious diatribes, called him the only priest he ever liked. Western leaders widely mistrusted him. His “flirtations” with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, an effort to limit NATO influence on the island, and his key role in the nonaligned movement led many to view him as the Castro of the Mediterranean. As for Makarios the

person, very little is known. He left no diaries or memoirs. Even those close to him say that they rarely knew what he was thinking.

### **1.3.2. Dr. Fazıl Küçük**

Born in Lefkosa in 1906, he studied medicine in the universities of Istanbul, Paris and Lausanne. After his studies, he started working as a practice in Cyprus, Lefkosa. However, he soon became the voice of Turkish Cypriots. In 1943, he founded the Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu (KATAK). Later on he left KATAK and established the Kıbrıs Milli Türk Halk Partisi (KMTHP). On 23 October



1949, KATAK and KMTHP united together to form Kıbrıs Milli Türk Birliği Partisi, which changed its name to Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi in 15 August 1955. On 1 April 1955 he formed the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT) to create an opposing force against the EOKA. During 1958, he held Taksim meetings in Turkey, during 1959 Zurich and London Conferences, he represented Turkish Cypriots and worked for the constitutional safety of Turkish Cypriots. On 3 December 1959, he was elected as the vice president of the newly formed Republic of Cyprus.

After violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots increased, he was elected as the president of the Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi. He held his positions as both the vice president of the Republic of the Cyprus and the president of the Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi until he was succeeded by Rauf Denktaş in 1973.

### **1.3.3. Rauf Denktash**



Born in Paphos in 1924, he qualified as a lawyer in Britain before returning to Cyprus. This is actually a surprisingly common background for Cypriot figures. During the anticolonial uprising he led a double life, serving as a prosecutor for the British authorities and leading Turkish

Cypriot resistance to enosis. Following independence, he became the president of the Turkish Cypriot communal chamber but continued his underground activities. After the outbreak of clashes in 1963, the Greek Cypriot-led government banned him from the island, arguing that he was a leader of the armed resistance.

## **2. Introduction to the Agenda: The 1964 Cyprus Question**

### **2.1. Historical Timeline**

#### **2.1.1. Background Context**

By virtue of its location at the far eastern end of the Mediterranean, Cyprus has always been regarded as a vital piece of strategic territory. Since ancient times, it came under the rule of the Persians, Egyptians, Romans, Byzantines, and Arabs. In 1191, the island was conquered by King Richard the Lionheart on his way to the Holy Land as part of the Third Crusade. He quickly sold it on to the Knights Templar. Realising that they could not control the island's unruly inhabitants, they quickly changed their mind and asked for a refund. Richard agreed, but only after having found another buyer—Guy de Lusignan, the former king of Jerusalem. Thus began three hundred years of Frankish rule over what became the kingdom of Cyprus. In 1489, this period came to an end with the death of Caterina Cornaro, the last queen of Cyprus. Cyprus then passed to Venetian rule.

As one might expect, most of these conquerors have left some sort of mark on the island. For example, following the conversion of Sergius Paulus, the Roman proconsul of the island, by Saints Paul and Barnabus, Cyprus became the first territory in the world to be ruled by a Christian. Four centuries later, while under Byzantine rule, the Cypriot Orthodox Church was recognised as autocephalous—that is, independent from any of the patriarchates that governed other Orthodox territories. This gave the church, and its leader, important privileges. Arab rule also had its effect. An important Islamic religious shrine built around the final resting place of the aunt of the Prophet Muhammad can be found on the shores of the salt lake just outside of Larnaca. Three centuries of rule by the Crusader Lusignan dynasty can be seen in the architecture of the island. The most famous buildings from this era are Kolossi Castle, near Limassol, and the Church of Saint Nicholas, in

Nicosia. Likewise, the Venetian rulers oversaw the construction of the mighty walls surrounding Nicosia and Famagusta, which still survive..

By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had conquered almost all of southeastern Europe and was in the process of securing full control over the eastern Mediterranean. In 1570, Sultan Selim II ordered the invasion of the island. Marching under the command of Mustafa Lala Pasha, the Ottoman forces conquered Nicosia after a brief siege. The sultan's army then marched eastwards and laid siege to the walled city of Famagusta. The city managed to hold out for almost a year before falling in August 1571. Although the Ottoman navy was subsequently beaten by Venetian and other Christian forces at the Battle of Lepanto, Venice was forced to accept the loss of Cyprus.

While Greek Cypriots often paint an extremely negative picture of Ottoman rule, the reality is rather more complex. Certainly there were hardships. After centuries of attention, Cyprus now became of marginal interest to the wider world. The island and its people suffered from punitive taxes and from neglect. Yet the island's new rulers also brought benefits. Most notably, the Ottoman conquest of the island may well have played a major role in ensuring the survival of Orthodox Christianity on the island. Under Lusignan and Venetian rule, the Catholic Church held primacy, and people were pressured to accept Rome's spiritual authority. (The most notable example of this was the Bulla Cypria issued by the Vatican in 1260. This document effectively gave control over appointments in the Orthodox Church to Catholic bishops on the island.) In contrast, the Muslim Ottomans took a much more benign view towards the Orthodox Church. As long as the people paid their taxes and did not rebel, the new rulers were happy to let them continue in their faith. Indeed, as happened elsewhere in the empire, the Church in Cyprus was co-opted into the running of the state, acting as the main link between the sultan and his Christian peoples. This meant that in addition to being the head of the church, the archbishop also assumed the title of ethnarch—leader of the Greek Cypriot people.

As for the relations between the Greek Cypriots and the newly emerging Turkish Cypriot community, on the whole there appeared to be relatively few problems between the two peoples for most of the

Ottoman period and until the latter stages of British rule. However, this should not be misconstrued to mean that relations between the two were without tensions. Partly for political reasons, to show that Greek and Turkish Cypriots can get along, and partly because they seem to want to believe it, Greek Cypriots often paint a far rosier picture of the relationship than was the case. While some Greek and Turkish Cypriots may have formed friendships, on the whole the two communities did not mix. Many villages were made up of one group or the other. Where they did live in the same town or village, they lived in different areas and had little direct contact in day-to-day life. Intermarriage was very rare.

### **2.1.2. Pre-1960 Colonial Rule and Independence Movements**

By the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was in steep decline. Following the formation of the Greek state in the first half of the nineteenth century, it faced growing pressure for independence from its other Balkan subjects. At the same time, it came under increasing threat from Russia, which sought access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. This led to several major wars between Constantinople and Moscow, including the Crimean War (1853–56) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78).

After the latter war, during which the Ottoman Empire lost several eastern provinces, the European powers gathered for the Congress of Berlin. There the map of the Balkans was redrawn. With Russian support, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania all became independent states. However, in an attempt to prevent further Russian aggression, Constantinople entered into an agreement with London to allow Britain to occupy and administer Cyprus. This agreement, known as the Cyprus Convention, was purely strategic in nature. In return for control of the island, London promised that it would help repel any future Russian attack on the Ottoman Empire's eastern provinces. For Britain, the convention was extremely beneficial geopolitically. Cyprus provided a useful base for ships travelling through the Suez Canal to India, Britain's most important colonial possession. Crucially, the agreement was only temporary. It stipulated that if Moscow returned the territories captured during the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War, Britain would hand back Cyprus to full Ottoman rule.

While Britain made clear that it had no intention of relinquishing control of Cyprus, it did take steps to improve life for the islanders. For a start, it undertook a number of major infrastructure projects. At the same time, important political reforms were instituted that laid the foundations for democracy in Cyprus. For example, elections were held for new bodies, such as the Legislative Council, that had some influence on local and Cyprus-wide administration. At the same time, the British authorities decided not to exercise direct control over the educational system, allowing Greek and Turkish-language schools to exist. Also, Greek- and Turkish-language newspapers began to emerge. However, there was another side to the arrangement. Under the terms of the Cyprus Convention, Britain had to pay a fixed annual sum to the Ottoman authorities. This was raised by taxation from the Cypriots themselves, who were also forced to pay for the costs of British administration. This 'tribute' hindered the island's economic development and contributed to resentment towards British rule.

Following the Ottoman Empire's decision to side with Germany at the start of the First World War, Britain's relationship with Cyprus changed dramatically. London annexed the island. In 1915, the following year, in a bid to induce Greece to join the war, London came close to granting the Greek Cypriots their wish and offered the island to Athens. Though the proposal was supported by Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek prime minister, it was rejected by the Greek king, Constantine I, who was determined to keep Greece out of the war. In the decade that followed, Britain strengthened its control over Cyprus. In 1923, under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, the new Republic of Turkey, the successor to the Ottoman Empire, formally relinquished its claims to the island and called on Turkish Cypriots to leave the island and settle in Turkey. Few heeded the call. Appalled at living conditions in Anatolia at the time and effectively prevented from leaving Cyprus by a largely unaffordable departure levy imposed by the British authorities, who did not want them to leave, most stayed where they were. On 10 March 1925, Britain formally declared Cyprus a Crown colony.

#### **2.1.2.1. 1955-1959**

##### **2.1.2.1.1. EOKA and the Turkish Response**

EOKA—the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters—was the Greek Cypriot militia formed to end British rule in Cyprus and bring about the island's union with Greece. (Crucially, and unlike anticolonial movements elsewhere in the world, it did not fight for independence.) At the same time that the Greek Cypriots were becoming more active in their pursuit of enosis, the Greek government started to take more interest in the future of the island. This marked a departure from the position of previous governments, which had wished to avoid antagonising Britain—a key political and economic benefactor. However, the emergence of the United States as the preeminent patron of Greece and Turkey in the late 1940s changed the situation. In 1953, the Greek prime minister, Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, decided to raise the issue of Cyprus during a meeting with Sir Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary. Eden declined to discuss the matter. Outraged at this response, Papagos now adopted a much more hard-line stance. On 3 May 1954, he announced that Greece would take the matter to the United Nations, but the United Kingdom successfully argued that the matter was an internal issue and not a matter for the UN. The General Assembly then decided not to deal with the Cyprus issue for the time being.

With the diplomatic and political avenues seemingly closed, Makarios authorised George Grivas, a Cypriot-born retired colonel of the Greek Army, to put together plans for an armed uprising to end British rule in Cyprus and unite the island with Greece. Despite rumours that a Greek Cypriot militia was being formed and weapons stockpiled, the British authorities apparently did not take the threat seriously. Indeed, it was not until January 1955, when a small Greek fishing boat boarded by the British Navy was found to be carrying a considerable quantity of weapons, that the true level of the threat became apparent. However, this discovery was made too late to stop the preparations for the rebellion. On 1 April 1955, a series of bombs exploded at administrative buildings around the island, marking the start of the EOKA uprising.

Despite its goal of achieving enosis, the EOKA leadership at first attempted to take a conciliatory line with the Turkish Cypriot community. In July 1955, just a few months after the start of the fighting, the organisation issued a Turkish-language pamphlet explaining its position and clarifying that the

struggle was aimed at ending British colonial rule and was not directed towards the Turkish Cypriots. The problem was that its ultimate objective, the union of the island with Greece, was strongly opposed by the Turkish Cypriot community. Preferring to remain under British rule rather than live under Greek administration, the Turkish Cypriot community rejected any association with EOKA. In fact, as the EOKA campaign grew in strength, the Turkish Cypriot community actively sided with the colonial authorities. For example, as more and more Greek Cypriots left the police force, either in solidarity with EOKA or out of fear of reprisal attacks by the movement, they were replaced by Turkish Cypriot officers. This in turn fed resentment among Greek Cypriots and led to accusations (at least partially true) that the British colonial authorities were engaged in a policy of divide and rule by deliberately fomenting division between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to strengthen their own position on this island. Meanwhile, the growing strength of the EOKA campaign led the Turkish Cypriots to retaliate and form a countermovement to oppose enosis. At first, their aim was either to keep the island under British rule or else have it ceded to Turkey. Later on, they sought to partition the island between Greece and Turkey, a policy known as taksim . To pursue these ambitions, they formed an organisation called Volkan (Volcano), which employed guerrilla tactics similar to those of the EOKA. Later on, the organisation was restructured with support from Turkey and changed its name to the Turkish Resistance Movement (often referred to by its Turkish acronym, TMT)

#### **2.1.2.1.2. Timeline of Intercommunal Violences and Events**

In 1956, some Turkish Cypriot policemen were killed by EOKA members and this provoked some intercommunal violence in the spring and summer, but these attacks on policemen were not motivated by the fact that they were Turkish Cypriots.

In January 1957, Grivas (leader of EOKA) changed his policy as his forces in the mountains became increasingly pressured by the British forces. In order to divert the attention of the British forces, EOKA members started to target Turkish Cypriot policemen intentionally in the towns, so that Turkish Cypriots would riot against the Greek Cypriots and the security forces would have to be diverted to the towns to restore order.

The killing of a Turkish Cypriot policeman on 19 January, when a power station was bombed, and the injury of three others, provoked three days of intercommunal violence in Nicosia. The two communities targeted each other in reprisals, at least one Greek Cypriot was killed and the army was deployed in the streets.

On 22 October 1957 Sir Hugh Mackintosh Foot replaced Sir John Harding as the British Governor of Cyprus. Foot suggested five to seven years of self-government before any final decision. His plan rejected both enosis and taksim.

By 1958 signs of dissatisfaction with the British increased on both sides, with Turkish Cypriots now forming Volkan, later known as the Turkish Resistance Organization paramilitary group to promote partition and the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey as dictated by the Menderes plan.

On 27 January 1958 British soldiers opened fire against a crowd of Turkish Cypriot rioters. The events continued until the next day.



*January 28th 1958 - 100 Turks are hurt and 2 killed in several days of anti-British riots in Nicosia*

27 and 28 January 1958 rejecting the proposed plan because the plan did not include partition. The British then withdrew the plan.

In June 1958 the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was expected to propose a plan to resolve the Cyprus issue. In light of the new development the Turks rioted in Nicosia to promote the idea that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not live together and therefore any plan that did not include partition would not be viable. This violence was soon followed by bombing, Greek Cypriot deaths and looting of Greek Cypriot-owned stores and houses. Greek and Turkish Cypriots started to flee mixed population villages where they were a minority in search of safety. This was effectively the beginning of segregation of the two communities.

On 7 June 1958 a bomb exploded at the entrance of the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus. Following the bombing Turkish Cypriots looted Greek Cypriot properties.

The crisis reached a climax on June 12, 1958 when eight Greeks, out of an armed group of thirty five arrested by soldiers of the Royal Horse Guards on suspicion of preparing an attack on the Turkish quarter of Skylloura, were killed in a suspected attack by Turkish Cypriot locals, near the village of Geunyeli having being ordered to walk back to their village of Kondemenos.

On August 15, 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed.

### **2.1.3. 1960 Independence and the Zurich-London Agreements**

#### **2.1.3.1. Zurich-London Agreements**

##### **2.1.3.1.1. Macmillan Plan**

The starting gun for the Zurich-London Agreements was in late 1958 within the effect of the Macmillan Plan. The Macmillan Plan, formally announced by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on 19 June 1958 (with a revised version on 15 August 1958), was Britain's attempt to resolve the escalating Cyprus Emergency while retaining sovereignty and military bases on the island.

It promised the joint governance of the island by the parties and rejected enosis and taksim. The main plan was that Cyprus would be associated with the UK (and the Commonwealth), Turkey and Greece with representatives consisting of Turkish and Greek states. The Representatives would advise the governor and cooperate on running the state. The governing mechanism would separate the Cypriot communities on the matter of communal affairs such as education, religion and such. The central government would consist of a council of ministers that came from both parties that would handle the mono ethnic, divided communities. The ultimate goal of the plan was to postpone the immediate self-determination of Cyprus by seven years and to turn Cyprus into a “symbol of cooperation” between the three NATO Allies.

Since the plan rejected the ideologies and aims of both sides by declining enosis and taksim, the plan was overall rejected. This was also due to the fact that the Greek Cypriot community wanted to reject British authority and control from the start. The Proposal's only achievement was to fuel the EOKA insurgency and affect NATO relations negatively. The failure of the plan boosted the road to the Zurich-London Agreements and subsequently the independence of Cyprus itself.

#### **2.1.3.1.2. The Initiation**

The initiation phase of the agreements was a very important breaking point over the course of Cyprus. With the failed Macmillan Plan and the rising pressure coming from the United States and NATO to repair the lost relationships between parties, Ankara and Athens felt the pressure. So Turkey and Greece formed a secret bilateral contact due to frustration of the plans mentioned previously and the rising tensions over the Cypriot Communities. This bilateral had informally initiated the Agreements. This event led to the formal negotiations in Zurich 5-11 January 1959 where Turkish President Adnan Menderes and Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis finalized their core agreements.

#### **2.1.3.1.3. Zurich-London Agreements**

In the beginning of 1958, the British government was fed up with the continuing EOKA warfare, not only because it was costly but because they wanted to get rid of the island. During those years British

leaders had adopted the idea of arranging some military bases, rather than keeping the whole island for their military needs. Greek leaders, on the other hand, in 1959, had no hope of achieving Enosis through bringing the problem to the U.N. Also there was the possibility of the enactment of partition thesis of the Turks. Due to these facts Greeks, “began to consider independence an acceptable first stage solution of the Cyprus crisis”. The only remaining solution seemed to be “independence”.

The Turkish administration was calling for compromise and was rejecting the Enosis plans of the Greeks. So when Greece wanted to have negotiations, Turks immediately accepted the offer. After Zorlu and Averoff’s meeting in Paris, Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers met in Zurich on 5-11 February 1959 and agreed on a formula for settling the Cyprus problem.

On 19 February, following a conference in London, attended by the representatives of Britain, Turkey, Greece, and the two Cypriot communities, an agreement was signed for the final settlement of the Cyprus dispute. With the abandonment of British rule the two communities came face to face, however they were not yet ready. The Zurich and London agreements prohibited Enosis and the two national communities became co-founder partners. Also during those agreements, the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus was drafted. According to this draft the State of Cyprus was going to be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turkish. Also the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President was granted a veto right (The Academic Team urges you to read the basic structure which is included in the appendices)



*From left to right: Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu, Turkish Prime Minister Menderes and Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff at the negotiations in Zürich, Switzerland*

The Zurich-London Settlement was welcomed both in Turkey and in Menderes administration, as it was not against the national interests of Turks. The Turks were convinced that from now on Cyprus was not going to unite with Greece. Another important thing during the 1959 agreements was the attitude of British leaders towards the Turkish Cypriots: They and Turkish representatives never agreed to define Turkish Cypriots as a “minority”. Instead they were recognized as one of the two communities on the island. On the other hand in 1959 settlement, Britain maintained sovereignty over two bases in Cyprus. (99 square miles). The borders of these bases were subsequently negotiated between the British Government and the representatives of the two Cypriot communities, and an agreement was reached on 1 July 1960.

According to the web pages written by the Greek Americans the Zurich and London agreements were imposed on the people of Cyprus and the real reason of their signing them was because “the sole

alternative would have been the continued denial of independence and freedom, continued bloodshed and, possibly the forced partition of Cyprus” (Hellenic Resources Institute).

#### **2.1.3.1.3.1. The Basic Structure of Cyprus**

The new Republic of Cyprus had a complex constitutional structure that was specifically designed to balance power between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in a way that would prevent the numerically much smaller Turkish Cypriot population from being sidelined by Greek Cypriots.

At the top of the system, power was divided between the president, who would be elected by the Greek Cypriot community, and the vice president, who would be elected by the Turkish Cypriot community. They would each have significant veto rights over bills and proposals. They would also preside over the Council of Ministers. This would be made up of seven Greek Cypriot ministers and three Turkish Cypriot ministers (one of whom would hold a major appointment—defence, foreign affairs, or finance). This 70:30 ratio between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was also the basis for power sharing in other institutions, including the civil service and the single-chamber House of Representatives, the new state’s parliament. (The one exception was in the armed forces, where the ratio would be 60:40.) In the case of the judiciary, the supreme constitutional court, the highest judicial body in the state, was made up of a Greek Cypriot judge, a Turkish Cypriot judge, and a neutral (foreign) judge, who would serve as the president of the court. In addition to the central government institutions, separate communal chambers were also established with responsibility over issues under the direct control of the two communities, such as educational, cultural, and religious matters.

The separation of the two communities was rigorously enforced under the political system. For example, in the event that the president was unable to carry out his duties or was absent from the island, he would be replaced by the president of the Greek Cypriot communal chamber. Likewise, if the vice president was incapacitated, his duties would be performed by the president of the Turkish Cypriot chamber. It was also notable that the new structures ensured that the two communities would retain strong ties with their respective ‘motherlands’, Greece and Turkey. For example, the Greek and

Turkish flags would be flown alongside the Cypriot flag on government buildings, and most of the holidays would be based on Greek and Turkish national holidays, many of which were religious in nature. Crucially, despite the important links that would exist between the new state and Greece and Turkey, enosis and taksim were openly ruled out as future options for the new state.

#### **2.1.3.1.4. Following Treaties**

To protect the newly established constitution, the UK, Greece and Turkey signed the Treaty of Guarantee. With the treaty, three countries took responsibility for protecting and preserving the sovereignty and the independence of Cyprus. The Treaty gave the Parties the right to intervene whenever a challenge occurred within or outside of Cyprus. While it was expected that this right of intervention would be invoked jointly by Britain, Greece, and Turkey, article 4 of the treaty stated that if this was not possible, any of the three countries could act to restore the status quo ante—in other words, the state of affairs established under the 1960 constitution.

The Treaty was disliked and criticized by the greek cypriot community heavily due to the fact that the powers were split on previously mentioned countries and not Cyprus stating that the state was not “truly independent”. More importantly, the treaty gave Turkey the rights to intervene explicitly to Cypriot affairs which would subsequently indicate that the intercommunal violence would be lowered. The Turkish Cypriots believed it to be a crucial aspect of the treaty. In the event that any steps were taken to try to change or dissolve the constitutional order created by the 1960 constitution or if an attempt was made to unite Cyprus and Greece, the Turkish government and military would be able to intervene. These articles were seen as the ultimate security mechanism to deal with the ongoing risk of enosis attempts by Turkish affiliated parties.

In addition to their right of intervention under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece and Turkey were also permitted under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance, another of the three key treaties signed at the time of Cypriot independence, to maintain small military contingents on the island. The Greek force was limited to 950 personnel, and Turkey was set to station 650 troops on the island. The

treaty also stated that the numbers could be altered upwards or downwards if so agreed by the president and vice president. Initially, these forces would be used to train the Cypriot army. At the same time, the treaty, which was signed between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, also envisaged that the three would work together for common defence of Cyprus and expected joint action if the territorial integrity of the republic was challenged.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Establishment, the third of the treaties, Britain was allowed to retain 99 square miles of the island as sovereign territory for military purposes. The “sovereign bases areas”, (or SBAs) as they are known, are divided into two main parts. In the east of the island, near Larnaca, there is an army garrison at Dhekeleia and a listening post at Ayios Nikolaos. In the west, near Limassol, there is an army base at Episkopi and an air force base at Akrotiri. At the same time, Britain was granted continued access to a number of other military facilities around the island. Over the years, many of these latter sites have been relinquished, but the main base areas remain under British control.

#### **2.1.4. Deterioration of the Constitution**

With the granting of independence, both communities hoped that the conflict that had been dividing Cyprus was at long-last solved. Needless to say, this was not the case. Although the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus granted separate rights to each community so that the minority would not be placed under the jurisdiction of the majority, Greek and Turkish community leaders have been in disagreement over the issue of constitutional rights since the Republic’s foundation. There were many branches where chambers opposed each other such as tax disputes and disputes over the national army. As the disputes got heavier Archbishop Makarios schemed the revival of the idea of enosis and made public statements on the matter, particularly on EOKA Day (March 31, 1963). Makarios also proposed a 13-Point Constitutional Amendment which stirred up quite a lot of reactions due to it violating article 182’s unmanageable provisions from the Zurich Agreement.

##### **2.1.4.1. 1961-1962 Income Tax Dispute**

Within the powers of article 87 and 88 of the constitution, the Turkish Communal Chamber was entitled to £400,000 and the Greek Communal Chamber £1,600,000 annually from the Republic's general revenue. Communal Chambers had the power to impose personal taxes and fees on their respective community members to cover expenses. Greek Cypriot House members advocated for centralized control of income taxes, where the central government would collect all taxes, retain a portion, and distribute the remainder proportionally based on collections from each community. Turkish Cypriot members rejected this as unconstitutional, insisting on adherence to the Constitution. A 27 Month trial period was proposed by the Turkish Chamber which stated that the central government only collected from foreign residents with the option to amend in the case of it turning out burdensome. The Greek Chamber Declined leading to a deadlock. Later on the citizens income taxes continued to be collected by separate chambers. One thing led to another and the central government started to fail to pay allotted shares which developed budget limitations.

#### **2.1.4.2. 1961 National Army Dispute**

In October 1961, Makarios proposed an integration of armed forces under the Greek Communal Chamber which Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük vetoed using his powers. Küçük came up with a counter proposal that separated community units but the counter proposal was declined by Makarios (Almost like there is a pattern or something). Ultimately, no steps were taken in order to establish a constitutional national army. When the 1963 Outbreak happened the already split forces of Cyprus went back to their original origin of TMT and EOKA by their ethnic identities.

#### **2.1.4.3. Separate Municipalities Issue**

On the Greek Cypriot side of the House, there was opposition to the establishment of separate municipalities, while they supported the Makarios decree on the implementation of the 1950 British Colonial Village Improvement Law, which enabled the establishment of Improvement Boards responsible for local administration, including health and cleanliness. Turkish Cypriots, represented by Küçük, Örek, and Denктаş, claimed the constitution was being undermined and went on to form separate municipalities for Turks, which Makarios refused to acknowledge. The Turkish government

sought the support of Ankara, gaining their support on the establishment of separate municipalities as well as constitutional rights.

On March 1, 1963, the Turkish Cypriots appealed the issue before the Supreme Constitutional Court, where Denktaş accused Makarios of acting like a dictator. On EOKA Day (March 31, 1963), Makarios declared the EOKA struggle unrelated to the Republic's creation, reaffirming enosis as the primary Greek Cypriot goal. Turkish Cypriots and leaders protested this as irresponsible; Küçük stated enosis was unacceptable and would be resisted by all legal means.

Then, on April 25, 1963, the Supreme Constitutional Court, headed by independent Judge Prof. Ernst Forsthoff, Turkish Judge Necati Münir, decided that the Improvement Boards were illegal, with Judge Michael Triantafyllides of Greece insisting there was no legal grounding for either plan. Nevertheless, Makarios, along with the Greek lawmakers, pushed on towards the effort of creating a unified municipality, which led to Forsthoff's resignation on July 15, 1963, as well as the resignation of his assistant, Dr. Christian Heinze. Forsthoff was to claim that the actual problem of the tensions between Cyprus was an attempt to lessen the rights of the Turkish Minority, a problem which could have been sorted out in a mere five years of being a constitutional state.

#### **2.1.4.4. Makarios's 13-Point Constitutional Amendment Proposals**

The previously mentioned disputes showed the fact that the 1960 Constitution had fundamental problems over the aspects of communal communication and decision making abilities which set up the stage for the Archbishop to create a set of amendments. The recurring pattern of disputes on tax and army policies of the state which obstructed the functioning of the state. The amendments go as follows:

1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned.

2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputize for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputize for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. Unified (integrated) municipalities to be established.
7. The administration of justice to be unified.
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a law (rather than fixed ratios in the Constitution).
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the Security Forces to be modified in proportion to the population ratio of the two communities (approximately 80:20 instead of the existing 60:40 for some forces).
11. The proportion of the participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the public service (including the army) to be modified in proportion to the population ratio.
12. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five (or seven in some versions), with decisions taken by simple majority.
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished (its functions transferred to ministries).

These proposals directly contravened the unamendable "basic articles" of the 1960 Constitution (incorporated from the Zurich Agreement under Article 182), which required any amendment to secure not only a Greek majority but also at least two-thirds of Turkish representatives' votes. The Turkish government rejected the 13-point proposal, but President Makarios dismissed the Turkish viewpoint, saying it constituted interference in the country's internal affairs. The Archbishop and the

Greek Cypriot legislators continued with their scheme, disregarding their disagreements with the Turks and violations against the Cyprus constitution, which specified the rights of the Turkish Cypriot expressly in order to prevent their domination or rule by the Greek Cypriots. Thus, the Turkish Cypriots announced that they were willing to sacrifice everything to avoid being dominated by the Greek Cypriots. Basically, there was no Turkish side any more, they were not being recognized. With all of these events, the fuse was set to a darker Cyprus.

#### **2.1.5. 1963 Crisis and Outbreak of Violence**

From December 1963 there were serious incidents of violence against Turkish-Cypriots, and since they were only 18% of the population, and lived in scattered communities they were easy targets despite the presence in Cyprus of UN forces. The violence against them became so bad that British troops had to intervene, and the Parachute Regiment in particular is still remembered by Turkish-Cypriots for their bravery in their defense. However, the position of British troops eventually became untenable and they withdrew.


On 28th December 1963 the Daily Express carried the following report from Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears."

On 14th January 1964 the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on 26th December 1963, and reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence of the Red Cross. A further massacre of Turkish-Cypriots, at Limassol, was reported by The Observer on 10th February 1964, and there were many more. 25,000-30,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced into enclaves, abandoning 103 villages. 364 Turkish Cypriots and

174 Greek Cypriots were killed during the violence.

#### 2.1.5.1. Bloody Christmas

The event took place in the early hours of December 21, 1963 Nicosia when Greek Cypriot Police stopped Civilian Turkish Cypriots for their identifications. The confrontations led to shots being fired and killing two Turkish Cypriots and then spiraled into widespread hysteria and chaos.



*The bathtub where Mürüvet İlhan and children, Murat, Kutsi, and Hakan were killed. The house is preserved today as the Museum of Barbarism.*

The most notable incident which occurred during the date is The murder of the family of Major Nihat İlhan, who had retired from the Turkish Army as a Medical Brigadier General and was serving with the 650-strong Turkish Cypriot Forces Regiment stationed in Cyprus under the 1960 agreements. His wife and three children were shot in their bathtub in Kumsal, symbolizing brutality for Turkish Cypriots.

### **3. Current Situation (as of March 1964)**

As of March, the intercommunal violence was still present and although it was limited to armed groups rather than regular army forces, it was only increasing. The Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave their villages and had to live in enclaves under poor conditions. Turkey and Greece were closely observing the situation and threatening to intervene militarily although no actual action had been taken.

#### **3.1. Ongoing Violence and Displacement**

Greek Cypriots were attacking Turk villages relentlessly, killing everyone in their way. Men, women and even children. Turkish Cypriots were left desperate. They were not prepared nor expecting such violence from the Greek Cypriots. Turk villages were raided, looted and burned. As much as 25000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced from their villages due to intercommunal violence and gathered in enclaves to live. The enclaves oftentimes had harsh conditions, were overpopulated and had poor living conditions. The enclaves were surrounded by territory that Greek Cypriots controlled, which limited the Turkish Cypriots access to sufficient food, water and other supplies.

##### **3.1.1. Enclaves**

The dictionary meaning of Enclave is “A portion of territory surrounded by a larger territory whose inhabitants are culturally or ethnically distinct.”. The Turkish Enclaves formed on various locations in Cyprus were running low on resources and had heavy external pressure in many ways. The enclaves faced a strict economic and material embargo that deprived residents of basic necessities, extending beyond military items to hinder everyday recovery and survival.

### **3.1.1.1. Humanitarian Needs**

A UN Secretary-General report from October 7, 1964, documented an extensive list of prohibited items entering or possessed in the enclaves, including:

- Fuels (petrol and diesel banned until at least late 1964, severely disrupting food transport; kerosene ban lifted by October 1964)
- Building materials (cement, timber, iron, thick steel plates, sand, crushed metal/stone—preventing repairs to war-damaged homes as winter approached)
- Clothing and shelter items (woolen clothing, tents and tent materials, khaki-colored cloth)
- Vehicle and machinery parts (automobile spare parts, tires, accumulators)
- Communication and other tools (radio sets, telephones, cables, wire including barbed wire, wire-cutters)
- Potential dual-use items (ammonium nitrate, explosives, safety fuses, electrical detonators, camouflage netting, mine detectors, iron pickets/poles/rods, boot studs, sulfur, galvanometers)

These simple restrictions of goods created serious humanitarian problems particularly for displaced refugees lacking proper shelter, warmth, or means to rebuild. Shortages of essentials like fuel and construction materials left many in precarious conditions, unable to return to economic normality.

### **3.1.1.2. Travel and Movement Restrictions**

Freedom of movement basically did not exist. The Greek Cypriot police had excessive checks that harassed Turkish civilians and made deliberate obstruction on checkpoints, airports and exc. The UN noted concerns over arbitrary arrests. Some examples are the initial total ban on movement in/out of enclaves like Lefka, later relaxed by October 1964 to permit eastward travel but not westward. Also Turkish Cypriot doctors were not allowed to travel freely in order to continue their work (which is also the same for farmers since their farms usually wouldn't be in enclaves).

### **3.1.1.3. Economic Situation and Widening Disparities**

An effective economic blockade prevented inter-community trade, leading to massive job losses as Turkish Cypriots could no longer commute to previous employment or access former income sources (farmlands or businesses outside enclaves). Unemployment soared, poverty deepened, and refugees were cut off from their livelihoods.

## **3.2. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots**

The Greek Cypriot community, constituting around 77-78% of the population of Cyprus (some 442,000 out of a total of 573,000 in the 1960 census), effectively dominated the central government of the Republic after the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots in late 1963. The Greek Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios III, the Greek Cypriot leader, governed with a cabinet composed of exclusively Greek Cypriots following the breakdown of power-sharing due to inter-communal fighting and a hung parliament.

To counter the Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries and a potential Turkish intervention, the Makarios government introduced the Cyprus National Guard in June 1964 (planning began in early 1964) as a conscript-based force, composed solely of Greek Cypriot males. The response was the replacement of the bicomunal Cyprus Army as proposed in the 1960 Constitution, but already proved ineffective.

Initial leadership by Greek officers (and veterans such as General Georgios Grivas, returning in 1964). The Hellenic Force in Cyprus (ELDYK) (strength 950); presently in existence under the auspices Supporting this has been a series of clandestine deliveries of further Greek military personnel and equipment (estimated to number several thousand in 1964). The National Guard rapidly grew through

compulsory service, reaching tens of thousands by mid-1964, and integrated former EOKA fighters. It positioned Greek Cypriots as the island's dominant military power. Makarios pursued his November 1963 constitutional reform proposals to eliminate Turkish Cypriot vetoes and separate institutions, viewing the bicomunal system's deadlocks (e.g., over taxation and municipalities) as dysfunctional barriers to efficient majority governance.

Meanwhile all this was happening with the Greek Cypriots, The Turkish Cypriot community, which consisted of some 18% of the population (about 104,000 in 1960), withdrew as a whole from the government institutions by early 1964. The pullout was caused by the escalating violence beginning in December 1963 (known as the “Bloody Christmas”), as well as concerns regarding personal security as attacks took place against Turkish villages. It was further influenced by the political hardliners in both communities, including an order from TMT regarding the need to unify in order to prepare themselves for defense. Thus ended the 1960 Power-Sharing Agreement.

Afterward, they retreated to many isolated and fortified enclaves, which covered only 2-3% of the island’s landmass, causing 25,000 to 30,000 people to be displaced as refugees by 1964. Conditions in the refugee camps were marked by severe hardship as previously mentioned before.

### **3.3. Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom**

Greece always supports the stand of the Greek Cypriots in the quest for enosis (union with Greece) through the secret delivery of military aid and the rejection of concessions that are potentially detrimental to the sovereignty of the Cypriots as the crisis is seen as an opportunity to promote Hellenic interests.

The Turkish government, as a guarantor in Cyprus, rejects the proposals for a change in the constitution in November 1963 and favors the Turkish Cypriot request for taksim (partition), seeing this as the only way for them to ensure their protection. Meanwhile, the Turkish government has been

providing the Turkish Cypriots with weaponry and soldiers to defend their enclaves. Turkey also uses the Treaty of Guarantee to set a legal basis for a possible military intervention in order to aid and secure Turkish Cypriot enclaves.

The United Kingdom, retaining sovereign bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia as the former colonial power and another guarantor, adopts a neutral stance focused on stability to safeguard its strategic interests.

#### **4. Key Actors and Bloc Positions**

##### **4.1. UNSC Permanent Members**

As of March 1964 the UNSC permanent members were China, Soviet Union, France, United Kingdom and United States. During the 1963-1964 Cyprus crisis, the permanent members aimed to prevent the violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots to emerge into a war between Turkey and Greece. The United States played a major role as a mediator between both sides and took a political approach to the problem. The United Kingdom was a guarantor power on Cyprus and aimed to maintain the peace and stability of Cyprus.

##### **4.2. UNSC Non-Permanent Members**

In 1964, the UNSC had 6 non permanent members that were Bolivia, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Ivory Coast, Morocco and Norway. During the voting of United Nations Security Council Resolution 186, all of the non permanent members voted in favor of the resolution which obligated them under the Charter.

##### **4.3. Positions of Guarantor Powers and Affected Parties**

The United Kingdom was one of the guarantor powers of Cyprus at the time and it aimed to prevent further conflicts and violence. At first, the United Kingdom acted as a peacekeeper and crisis manager along with Greece and Turkey. Although the United Kingdom had several military bases in Cyprus, it never militarily intervened during the 1963-1964 crisis. The United Kingdom held its peacekeeper role until 4 March 1964, where it was finally handed over to the United Nations with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 186, which asked the Cyprus government to take additional measures to avoid any possible conflicts and suggested the establishment of a peacekeeping force.

The Turkish Cypriots had to withdraw from the government during attacks and suffered from constant violence from Greek Cypriots aggressions, as much as 25000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced from their villages and got separated, lost their jobs and forced to live under enclaves left under poor conditions that were barely enough for survival.

The Greek Cypriots argued that the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots was not related to the intercommunal violence, but was rather because the Turkish Cypriots planned to form their own administration. They increased the pressure on Turkish Cypriots, forcing them to leave their homes and valuables behind. As the intercommunal violence and conflicts grew bigger, the UNSC had to step in and formed the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus.

#### **4.4. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)**

As the tension and violence grew between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the United Nations Security Council formed the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) under the Resolution 186 on March 4 1964 to relieve the intercommunal tension and stabilize the situation.

Following the Cypriot coup d'état backed by the Greek military junta on 15 July 1974 and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus five days later as a response to the coup d'état which resulted in the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, the UNSC scaled up the mission and deployed the UNFICYP back at the United Nations Buffer Zone in Cyprus to prevent the conflicts to emerge into full fetched war, tasked with ensuring peace, assisting in the maintenance of the military status quo and also seeking a diplomatic ground that was suitable for both communities.

## **5. Possible Solutions and Strategies**

### **5.1. Peacekeeping Mandates and Operations**

Peacekeeping solutions were active in Cyprus in 1964 with the establishment of the United Nations Buffer Zone in Cyprus, also known as the Green Line, patrolled by the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (Resolution 186). At the time, the functions and power of the peacekeeping forces included preventing further conflicts, contributing to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and the return to normal conditions. Although the personnel were armed, the force lacked the authority to take offensive actions and was limited to negotiating, persuasion and moral suasion to function and was only allowed to use force for self defence purposes. A possible peacekeeping force solution could include expanding the authority and power of the forces. The peacekeeping forces should be tasked with preventing any violence and conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, acting as a deterrent and buffer force in the area and ensuring law and order is maintained. The force should make sure that both sides' rights are not violated and if violated, take action accordingly and report to the Security Council.

### **5.2. Mediation and Constitutional Reforms**

Mediation and constitutional reforms can be made in order to restore functional governance that was previously deadlocked by the 1960 constitution. The Constitutional reforms are a pathway to mediate the communities within the framework of the 1960 constitution. Any type of reform that pleases both parties and creates an equal tone is a candidate for a viable solution. These reforms can range up to whole amendments starting from the very first articles to arranging the ratios of ethnic cypriots in the administration or the army.

### **5.3. The Two State Solution**

The two state solution suggests the permanent division of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots to the north and south of the island respectively. Turkish Cypriots claim they have the right of self determination

and favor partition rather than reunification or bizonal bicomunal federation. According to Taksim supported by the Turkish Cypriots, the island would be divided into two independent parts, recognizing the Turkish Cypriots as a distinct ethnic group. Although both Greek and Turkish Cypriots opposed the two state solution at first, favoring a unified single state, the violent actions of the Greek Cypriots concerned Turkish Cypriots that such reunification could result in Greek Cypriots dominance.

#### **5.4. The Federal Solution**

The federal solution suggests the creation of a single federal state, uniting the parties together under one sovereignty. The federal solution would divide the island to two states with a Turkish state in the northern part of the island and a Greek state in the southern part of the island. A federal government would be formed to handle international affairs, foreign policy, national security and matters concerning the whole island. The federal government would consist mostly of Greek Cypriots due to them being a majority on the island. This brings up the question whether the rights of the Turkish Cypriots will be guaranteed or not. In the past, although Turkish Cypriots rights and political equality were guaranteed and both parties had veto rights, the Turks lost their rights due to 13 amendments passed by the Greek Cypriots majority. Therefore, Turkish Cypriots are against the federal solution unless their rights are protected not only by law, but also by Turkish military presence which Greek Cypriots are against as they claim it would violate the sovereignty of the country and allow Turkey to militarily intervene at any given moment.

### **6. Questions to Be Addressed**

- 1. How can the UN address the displacement of civilians and meet the immediate humanitarian needs arising from the violence?**
- 2. How can the UN Security Council effectively prevent the recurrence of intercommunal violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots?**

3. **How can the constitutional framework of Cyprus be reformed to address the grievances and ensure the rights of both communities?**
4. **What role should the guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) play in resolving the crisis and upholding the Treaty of Guarantee?**
5. **What measures can be taken to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus amid Cold War rivalries and external pressures?**
6. **What should be the mandate, composition, and duration of a proposed United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus?**
7. **How should the United Nations facilitate dialogue and mediation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities?**

## 7. Further Research and Additional Material

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[Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus](#)

[Treaty of Alliance](#)

[Treaty of Guarantee](#)

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